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THE DUTY TO PREVENT HANDICAPS: LAWS
PROMOTING THE PREVENTION OF
HANDICAPS TO NEWBORNS
JEFFREY A. PARNESS*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Lawmakers addressing the problem of legal rights of the handicapped traditionally have tended to focus on the legal rights afforded
those persons already possessing certain physical or mental handicaps.' Specifically, their focus has usually centered on either the
rights of the handicapped to compensation, or their rights related to
opportunities in employment, rehabilitation, or mobility. 2 Commentators have paid little attention to the legal rights, if any, that may be
afforded those not yet handicapped, or to legal rights designed to
prevent future handicaps. This failure is unfortunate because social
policy favors the avoidance or elimination of handicaps wherever
3
possible.
* Associate Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University. B.A., Colby College;
J.D., University of Chicago.

I.

See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 250 (West 1979) (intent of legislature

to provide for the necessary medical services required by physically handicapped children whose parents are unable to pay for these services); id. § 341 (West Supp. 1982)
(program of medical care and social support services for persons with handicapping conditions). Of course, through tort recovery and by other means, laws allow the handicapped to obtain compensation for handicaps from those who caused such handicaps.
2. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1405 (Supp. V 1981) (promoting employment of the handicapped); id. § 1406 (West 1976 & Supp. V 1981) (promoting mobility of the handicapped), § 1412(1) (West 1976 & Supp. V 1981) (promoting education of the
handicapped); 29 U.S.C. § 720 (West 1976 & Supp. V 1981) (promoting preparation of
the handicapped for employment); id. § 793 (promoting employment of the handi-

capped). At times, laws do seek to prevent handicaps. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE

§ 309 (West Supp. 1982) (policy of state to detect as early as possible preventable heritable disorders); id. § 429.11 (West 1979) (program of occupational health and occupational disease prevention); id. § 321.2 (West Supp. 1982) (child health and disability
prevention program).
3. 42 U.S.C.A. § 701(a)(2) (West Supp. 1975-1981) (authorization of appropriations for states to reduce "the incidence of preventable diseases and handicapping conditions among children"); 42 U.S.C. § 241(a) (Supp. IV 1980) (mandating that the
Secretary of Health and Human Services promote research relating to the prevention of

physical and mental diseases and impairments of man); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE

§ 150(c) (West 1979) (state policy to alleviate or cure hereditary disorders) id. § 309
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This lack of commentary on the propriety of laws designed to
prevent handicaps is particularly troublesome. Recent scientific advances have increased the understanding of the causes and prevention of many forms of physical and mental handicaps. 4 Many of
these advances involve handicaps that can be projected or discovered prior to birth, 5 the prevention of which can be furthered by legal regulation of the various stages of life, or potential life, prior to
live birth. While undoubtedly there has been tremendous growth in
the legal rights of a handicapped infant through compensation from
those responsible for the handicaps, and through other opportunities
for a meaningful future life, further legal regulation is needed to prevent those handicaps which are reasonably certain to occur. Compensation for handicaps is not only less desirable than their
prevention, but in many cases compensation is not presently available for preventable handicaps.
In focusing on the means by which laws can prevent handicaps
for future generations, at least four distinct inquiries should be
made. First, attention must be paid to the type of conduct that can
be subjected to legal regulation, that is, what constitutes unreasonable conduct or perhaps reasonable but unwarranted conduct toward
the unborn? Second, note must be taken of the'people who can be
subjected to legal regulation, that is, who can be made legally responsible for their conduct toward the unborn? Third, consideration
must be given to the appropriate type of legal regulator, that is, who
can be made responsible for setting the standards of legally acceptable conduct toward the unborn? Fourth, inquiry must be pursued on
the possible sanctions available for the violations of any legal regula(West Supp. 1982) (state policy supporting early detection of preventable heritable disorders leading to mental retardation or physical defects) id. § 428 (West 1979) (state program for the prevention of blindness); MD. PUB. HEALTH CODE ANN. § 13-102 (1982)
(state policy to alleviate or cure hereditary disorders).
4. With these advances have come both legal change and legal commentary. On
advances ingenetics, see P. REILLY, GENETICS, LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977): Rogers.

Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth: Medical Malpractice in Genetic Counseling and Prenatal Testing, 33 S.C.L. REV. 713 (1982); Waltz & Thigpen, Genetic Screening and Counseling: The Legal and Ethical Issues, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 696 (1973).

5. For reports of recent surgeries on fetuses, see Medicine-Surgeir in the Womb:

Operating on the Fetus to head off birth defects, TIME, Aug. 10, 1981, at 59 (Calif.
hydronephroses and hydorcephalus cases); Surgery on fetus, AKRON BEACON J.. May 11.

1982, at A7 (Connecticut case involving massively bloated kidney); Surgery on fetus offers
new hope, AKRON BEACON J., March 1I, 1982, at A7; 24-week-oldfetus survives surgerr
out of the womb, AKRON BEACON J., Nov. 15, 1981, at GI (each case involving out of
womb surgery on fetus, which was later returned to the womb).
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tions, that is, what happens to those who act irresponsibly toward the
unborn?
These inquiries should not be foreclosed or delayed because recent scientific advances provide less than definitive conclusions regarding the causes and means of preventing handicaps. While
preliminary or tentative scientific findings counsel caution in the implementation of legal standards, there is currently much that can be
done to prevent the "costly and tragic and sometimes deadly burdens
to the health and well-being" 6 of the citizenry prompted by the birth
of handicapped newborns. As scientific and medical advances produce more definitive conclusions, the inquiries should quickly be
made and legal action therefrom should promptly be implemented.
There looms the prospect of unprecedented harm if the traditional
lag or delay between scientific advance and legal change is
7
tolerated.
II.

CONTEMPORARY SCIENTIFIC AND MEDICAL UNDERSTANDING

OF PREVENTING HANDICAPS TO NEWBORNS

The past few years have brought significant advances to our understanding of the causes and the prevention of many handicaps of
the newborn. This understanding encompasses the various stages of
a newborn's potential life including: preconception; postconception,
but previability; postconception and postviability, but prebirth; and
birthing. It also encompasses the various people responsible for the
newborn's birth, including the mother, the father, and the attending
medical personnel. Additionally, it encompasses the varying physical as well as mental handicaps afflicting newborns. An awareness
of this understanding of handicaps can be gleaned not only from
contemporary medical texts and journals, many of which are incomprehensible to most of us, but also from legal developments during
the last two decades, which are at times more comprehensible.
During the preconception stage, the potentiality of handicaps
for those subsequently born alive may be triggered by maternal, paternal, or parental acts. Thus, in Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Labo6. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 150(b) (West 1979); MD. PUB. HEALTH CODE
ANN. § 13-102(2) (1982).
"Where one part of culture changes first through some discovery or in7.
vention, and occasions changes in some part of culture dependent upon it, there
The extent of this lag will vary ... but may exist
frequently is a delay ....
for ... years, during which time there may be said to be a maladjustment."
Note, The Constitutionalityof Mandatory Genetic Screening Statutes, 31 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 897, 901 n.28 (1981) (quoting W. OGBURN, SOCIAL CHANGE WITH RESPECT TO
CULTURE AND ORIGINAL NATURE

201 (1922)).
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ratories, Inc.." a woman's use of an oral contraceptive product was
alleged to have caused the mongoloid condition of the woman's subsequently conceived and born twin daughters.9 Similarly it was recently reported that litigation was being readied on a claim against
an employer whose male employees' exposure to defoliant chemicals
caused hip defects in the employees' offspring.' 0 Finally, certain
criminal incest laws prohibit sexual conduct between certain prospective parents on the sole ground that their offspring are likely to
be born with congenital malformations."I Non-parental acts can
also trigger the potentiality of handicaps for those as yet conceived.
2
a hospital and its director
Thus, in Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital,1
of laboratories were alleged to have caused permanent damage to
the brain and the central nervous system of a newborn by negligently
transfusing the newborn's mother with incompatible blood nine
years earlier.' 3 In Bergstreser v. Mitchell, 14 a hospital and its physicians were alleged to have caused brain damage to a newborn as the
result of a negligently performed caesarean section on its mother
during a pregnancy approximately two and a half years earlier.' 5
During pregnancy, the potentiality of handicaps may be triggered by a variety of acts by any number of differing actors. In hundreds of lawsuits filed during the last decade, a mother's ingestion of
8. 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973).
9. id. at 238. 240 n.3.
10. Marcus, First Work-Hazard Suit Oer Genetic Risk to Men, NAT'L L.J. March
2. 1981, at 4. For similar recent cases. see Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the
Fetus:" The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection with Emplo rment Opportunii Goals Under
Title VII, 69 GEO. L.J. 641, 664 n.154 (1981) (cases involving Agent Orange, DBCP'and
atomic bomb radiation).
11. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-10 (Smith-Hurd 1979) (defining aggravated incest as "'sexual intercourse" between any male and his "'blood daughter- or between any female and her "blood son", regardless of age). Thus prosecutions can occur
in Illinois even when the daughter or son is "sufficiently mature and autonomous to be
free from undue parental pressure to submit to sexual advances." Id. (committee comments). In such prosecutions, biological risks to the potential offspring serve as the only
legitimate state interest. Id. § Il-Il (committee comments) (noting the biological risks),
Developments in the Law, The Constitution and The Famihr, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156. 126869 (1980) (indicating the impropriety of basing incest laws on the desire to promote tradition).
On the likelihood of congenital malformations in the offspring of those with consanguineal relations, see Bailey & McCabe, Reforming the Law ofIncest, 1979 CRIM. L.
REV. 749, 757-58; Developments in the Law, The Constitution and The Family, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 1156, 1246-65 (1980).
12. 67 Ill. 2d 348. 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977).
13. Id. at 349-50. 367 N.E.2d at 1251.
14. 577 F.2d 22, 24 (8th Cir. 1978).
15. Id. at 24.
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a prescription drug known as diethylstilbestrol (DES) during pregnancy was alleged to have caused birth defects in later-born children.' 6 Similarly, suits involving birth defects caused by the earlier
negligence of an automobile driver involved in an accident with a
pregnant woman are now commonplace.' 7 Other pregnancy stage
acts that have been linked in litigation to birth defects include irradiation,'18 exposure to lead,' 9 and heroin addiction. 20
During the birthing process, a variety of acts can trigger the potentiality of handicaps at birth, though the possible actors are typically limited to those medical personnel responsible for facilitating
delivery. In Libby v. Conway, 2' damages were awarded for serious
brain damage to a newborn resulting when the attending physician,
nurses, and anesthetist negligently pushed with considerable force on
the mother's stomach during delivery. 2 2 In Larrabee v. United
States,23 a physician was held liable for a newborn's blindness resulting from a negligent use of forceps in delivery. 24 Similarly, in
Norland v. Washington GeneralHospital,2 an obstetrician was found
responsible for causing quadriplegia by applying excessive force in
effecting emergence of the head during a breech delivery. 26
Legal developments demonstrating an awareness of scientific
and medical advances in the understanding of human handicaps at
birth extend beyond circumstances wherein defendants are charged
with triggering the potentiality of human handicaps prior to birth.
These developments embody responses to advances in the capability
of predicting handicaps. For example, these advances have
prompted discussions in recent years regarding significant extensions
of the legal duty to convey certain correct information to a prospec16.

Champion, DES and Litigation.- The First Ten Years. 2 THE REVIEW OF LITI171(1982).
17. An early case is Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417. 79 A.2d 550 (1951).
For a compilation of cases, see Annot., 40 A.L.R. 3d 1222 (1971).
18. Salinetro v. Nystrom, 341 So. 2d 1059, 1060 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977). For a
GATION

criticism of this decision, see Perdue, An Analysis of the Phsician"s ProfessionalLiability

for Radiation of the Fetus, 18 Hous. L. REV. 801. 812-13 (1981) (suggesting a burden
upon a physician, not a potentially pregnant patient, to make an analysis of the possibility of pregnancy before suggesting x-rays).
19. Williams, supra note 10, at 641.
20. Reyes v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214. 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1977).
21. 192 Cal. App. 2d 865, 13 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1961).
22. Id. at 869-70, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
23. 254 F. Supp. 613 (S.D. Cal. 1966).
24. Id. at 614, 617.
25. 461 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1972).
26.

Id. at 696, 699.
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tive parent or parents, relating to them the probability that their future offspring may be born with physical or mental handicaps.2 7 The
court in Turpin v. Sortini held that this duty would most often be
owed by those possessing no responsibility for any possible handicaps. 28 The duty to inform encompasses situations in which the prospective parent or parents seek information and counsel, and their
29
request is followed by such acts as a negligent misrepresentation, 32
3
an omission of fact,30 or fraud. ' This duty can arise either before
33
or after conception. Of course, although the duty is imposed primarily to promote informed decisionmaking regarding childbearing,
breach of the duty often leads to the birth of a handicapped newborn
who otherwise would not have been born. 34 Thus, increased recog-

27. This information can be used in a number of settings, for example, during
determinations on whether to bear or beget children and during determinations on
whether medical treatment should be sought for children prior to their birth. Turpin v.
Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 961 n.8, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 344 n.8 (1982). This information can
be directly related, as well, to the chances for handicaps or simply be information by
which the chances for handicaps can be learned. Compare Becker v. Schwartz, 46
N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (prior to conceiving a second child,
the parents were incorrectly informed that their first child's disease did not result in increased chances that a subsequent baby would be similarly diseased) with Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1982) (prior to conceiving a second child, parents
were incorrectly informed that their first child did not have a hereditary ailment impairing her hearing).
28. 643 P.2d 954, 961 n.8, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 344 n.8 (1982).
29. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
30. Williams, supra note 10.
31. Does one prospective parent have a duty to be truthful to another prospective
parent about his or her genetic load or other deficiencies likely to result in handicapped
offspring? Consider the recent suit by a disgruntled lover involving deception regarding
the partner's affliction with herpes. Chicago Sun-Times, Mar. 6, 1983, (Living), at 3, col.
1;Will, New Law ofSexual Responsibility? id., Feb. 25, 1983, at 35, col. I. See also Piper
v. Hoard, 107 N.Y. 73, 13 N.E. 626 (1887) (male fraudulently represented to female prior
to their marriage his ownership of land and its availability to any subsequently born
child).
32. Supra note 27; Moores v. Lucas, 405 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
33. Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981) (after performing unsuccessful abortion on woman who feared having her third child with inherited disease,
gynecologist persistently assured woman she was not pregnant; the result was the premature birth of a child with neurofibromatosis); Naccash v. Burger, 223 Va. 406, 290 S.E.2d
825 (1982) (after testing the father, doctor erroneously assured parents that their previable fetus would not be afflicted with Tay-Sachs disease).
34. Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978)
(failure to advise pregnant woman of increased risk of Down's Syndrome and the availability of amniocentesis led to decision to bear child); Turpin, 643 P.2d at 954, 182 Cal.
Rptr. at 337 (failure to advise parents that their first child was "stone deaf" led to the
conception and birth of a second child); Naccash v. Burger, 223 Va. 406, 290 S.E.2d 825
(1982) (erroneous Tay-Sachs report on father led mother to decide to continue pregnancy
and bear a child). While duty and breach of duty often are easily established, the meas-
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nition of and respect for a duty to inform would inevitably lead to
fewer handicapped newborns. This may be said to constitute a sec35
ond form of handicap prevention.
While the foregoing review illustrates the manner in which the
law has adapted to increased understanding of birth defects, it is by
no means exhaustive. 36 More importantly, many scientific and medical developments have as yet neither influenced legal standards, nor
sufficiently matured to the point that legal change would be appropriate. Undoubtedly, during the next few years there will be further
influence and further maturation. Why then is there the concern
with future legal reaction to any increased scientific and medical understanding, since one could suggest that, to date, the "maladjustment" caused by the time lag between medical-scientific advances
and the law has not been unusual. 37 The answer is simple and lies in
the prospect of unprecedented harm that could have been prevented
had the law reacted more swiftly. To date, lawmakers generally
have left for another day difficult questions regarding claims such as
those involving genetic damages done to successive generations of
people as a result of a nuclear accident, or perpetual claims arising
from a chemical accident or long-term radiation exposure. 38 While
lawmakers, in conjunction with scientists and others, certainly are
ure of damages to prospective parents remains quite controversial, Wilczynski v. Goodman, 73 111.App. 3d'51, 58-63, 391 N.E.2d 479, 485-88 (1979) (reviewing recent cases), as
do the questions of whether the handicapped newborn possesses her own cause of action,

Turpin, 643 P.2d at 957-61, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 340-44 (reviewing recent cases), and the
nature of the newborn's damage recovery should a duty to the newborn also be deemed
breached, Turpin, 643 P.2d at 961-66, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 344-49 (reviewing recent cases).
35. Just how far the right to decide about childbearing extends is not yet known,

and so also unknown is the breadth of information regarding childbearing which must be

conveyed to prospective parents. Note, Sex Selection Abortion. A ConstitutionalAnalysis
of the Abortion Liberty and a Person's Right to Know, 56 IND. L.J. 281 (1981) (suggesting
that a woman does not have the right to abort for whatever reason she alone chooses, that
a state could prohibit sex selection amniocentesis, and that a state could thus prevent a

woman from discovering the sex of the fetus she carries).
36. Besides creating responsibilities for those who trigger the potentiality of handicaps prior to birth and for those who inadequately convey information to prospective
parents, the law could promote nonparental conduct protective of the unborn. Consider,
for example, employer's fetal protection policies which seek to prevent handicaps to employee's offspring, often over the employee's objections. Doerr v. B. F. Goodrich Co.,
484 F. Supp. 320 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (employer's policy precluding female employees of
childbearing capacity access to work environments entailing exposure to chemical vinyl
chloride challenged by employees); Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Olin, 24
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1646, 1658, 1664 (W.D.N.C. 1980) (similar employer policy

found nondiscriminatory under Title VII); Christman v. American Cyanamid Co., 92
F.R.D. 441 (N.D.W. Va. 1981).
37. Note, supra note 7.
38. Renslow, 67 I11.
2d at 358, 367 N.E.2d at 1255.
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not competent to foreclose all future harm, clearly more can now be
done.
III.

CONTEMPORARY LAWS ON PREVENTING HANDICAPS
TO NEWBORNS

To date, laws promoting the prevention of handicaps to
newborns have been indirect in that their central purpose usually
rests upon such other, albeit legitimate, grounds such as compensation for and deterrence of socially undesirable conduct. Often, these
grounds are promoted in tort and criminal law. Thus, where a preventable handicap is not avoided due to the negligence of a physician, compensation can be recovered in a tort action for the resulting
handicap. 39 Where a physical condition suggesting a potential handicap is not eliminated due to the negligence of a physician, again,
compensation under tort law is available for the resulting handicap. 40 Finally, criminal sanctions are often imposed on those whose
conduct causes a newborn to be afflicted with either mental or physical handicaps, although the affliction is not a requisite for the impo41
sition of sanctions.
As well, laws promoting the avoidance and elimination of
handicaps to newborns have been incoherent and only occasionally
further such underlying purposes as compensation and deterrence.
For example, where a preventable handicap is not avoided or eliminated due to negligence, compensation may only be forthcoming if
the negligent act occurred after conception. 4 2 In addition, preconception or pre-birth conduct resulting in a newborn's handicap may
not be subject to criminal sanction, despite the fact that similar conduct involving a born person would trigger possible criminal
34.

39.

The legal parameters of such compensation are often unclear. See supra note

40. Renslow, 67 I11.2d at 350, 357, 367 N.E.2d at 1251, 1255 (in part. defendant
responsible for not notifying woman that she had been administered incompatible blood
which could result in handicaps to future offspring, where the court referred to scientific
techniques which can mitigate or alleviate a child's prenatal harm): Turpin. 643 P.2d at
961 n.8, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 344 n.8.
41. See, e.g., Reyes v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912
(1977) (heroin use during last two months of pregnancy, despite public health nurse's
warning, led to twin boys' heroin addiction and to a finding that the felony child endangering statute was not violated).
42. Albala v. City of New York, 54 N.Y.2d 269. 429 N.E.2d 786. 445 N.Y.S.2d 108
(1981) (tort committed against the mother of a child not yet conceived does not give rise
to a cause of action in favor of the child even if that tort caused injury to the child during
gestation. resulting in the child's being born with a damaged brain).
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proceedings.4 3
Prevention of handicaps to newborns could easily be more fully
promoted by making compensation and deterrence laws more direct
and more coherent. Tort law should generally recognize, for example, a duty to prevent handicaps owed to the unborn by those having
contact with the prospective parent or parents. Thus, where a physician's treatment of a woman results in her giving birth to a child with
a preventable handicap, it should be found that the physician
breached a duty owed to the newborn-regardless of any duty owed
or breached to the woman. Similarly, criminal law should recognize
more often than it does now, for example, that one not yet born can
be the victim of crime. Thus, an assault causing only minor injury to
a pregnant woman but resulting in the death of her fetus, should be
prosecutable as a form of homicide.
Even if laws aimed at compensation and deterrence were more
comprehensive, they would still generally operate only after the onset of handicaps, when the link between individual conduct and resulting handicaps could be clearly established within a reasonable
period of time. These laws are not used: (1) To secure equitable
relief prior to the onset of handicaps;4 (2) to address non-individualized conduct such as industry-wide practices of various corporations
within an enterprise where no single entity can be proven responsible for particular handicaps; 45 (3) to cover conduct which is somewhat far removed in time, but not in actual causal link, from
handicaps; 4 6 or (4) to encompass activity which may lead to signifi43. See, e.g., Reyes v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912
(1977).
44. Among other problems, a particular couple may be unable to foresee that certain conduct will lead to the onset of handicaps for their future offspring, though governmental officials could foresee that a certain number of handicaps would occur if such
conduct gener:Il, continued. As well, even if the onset of particular handicaps was foreseeable, equitable relief may be barred for there are not facts supporting irreparable
harm or the legal remedies available subsequent to the onset of handicaps might be
deemed adequate. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Lennen, 640 F.2d 255, 259
(10th Cir. 1981) (traditional equitable requirements only unnecessary in a suit to enjoin
prohibited conduct where statute expressly establishes lesser requirements).
45. Consider recent litigation involving pregnant women's use of DES where there
has been an inability of many claimants to prove which company manufactured the drug
used. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132,
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Payton v. Abbott Laboratories, 386 Mass. 540, 437
N.E.2d 171 (1982). For an attempt to help claimants pursue further information on DES.
see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 349 (West Supp. 1982) (establishment of a public
and professional information campaign on DES).
46. The problem of defending stale claims may render inapplicable laws otherwise
relevant. Renslow, 67 111.2d at 358, 369-70, 372, 367 N.E.2d at 1255, 1261, 1262.
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cant handicaps for many, but which is not definitively linked by
scientists to the onset of such handicaps.4 7 It can thus be said that
laws promoting the avoidance and elimination of handicaps to
newborns are inadequate and that legal change beyond the bounds
of tort and criminal law is in order.
Recently, some encouraging signs have emerged, indicating that
lawmakers recognize existing compensation and deterrence-based
rules as an inadequate means of promoting the prevention of handicaps to newborns. As further scientific and medical advances are
made regarding the prevention of handicaps, early legal developments in the creation of a legal duty to prevent handicaps will provide a foundation upon which future laws can be fashioned.
One such early development was the creation of the Maryland
Commission on Hereditary Disorders.4 8 This creation was prompted
by legislative findings that "hereditary disorders are often costly and
tragic and sometimes deadly burdens to the health and well-being of
the citizens" 49 and that detection through screening, as well as increased medical knowledge, of hereditary disorders may lead to their
alleviation or cure.5 0 In view of such findings, the Commission was
delegated the authority "to adopt rules, regulations, and standards
for the detection and management of hereditary disorders. ' 51 The
need for such a delegation was based on the further legislative finding that "legislation designed to alleviate the problems associated
with specific hereditary disorders may tend to be inflexible in the
52
face of rapidly expanding medical knowledge.1
The Maryland Commission's ability to promote the prevention
of handicaps caused by hereditary disorders is limited in several
major ways. First, individual participation in a hereditary disorder
program should always be "wholly voluntary. '53 Second, a hereditary disorder program can never "require restriction of childbearing" 5 4 or "be a prerequisite for eligibility for any service or other
47. For a recent review of scientific evidence and scientific speculation regarding
the fetally toxic work environment, see Furnish, PrenatalExposure to Fetally Toxic Work
Environments.- The Dilemma of the 1978 Pregnancy Amendment to Title VII of the Civil
RightsAct of 1964, 66 IowA L. REV. 63, 119-29 (1980).
48. MD. PUB. HEALTH CODE ANN. § 13-101 (1982).
49. Id. § 13-102(2).

50. Id. §§ 13-102(3i), 13-102(3ii).
51. Id. § 13-109(a).
52.
53.
54.

Id. § 13-102(8).
Id. §§ 13-102(10), 13-109(f)(1).
Id. § 13-109(f)(2).
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program." 55 Finally, individual participants in a screening program
for a hereditary disorder are subject only to nondirective counseling
so that counselors simply provide the information needed for their
56
clients to make decisions and avoid influencing those decisions.
Generally, when states have sought legislatively to prevent
handicaps in newborns caused by nonhereditary factors, a similar
voluntary, noncoercive, and nondirective approach is taken. In addition to the enactment of a Hereditary Disorders Act quite comparable to that of Maryland,57 the California legislature sought to
prevent other forms of birth handicaps with a similar approach. For
example, the California State Department of Health Services is authorized to "conduct a statewide program for providing nutritional
food supplements to low-income pregnant women."5 8 This authorization was based upon a legislative finding that "evidence increasingly points to adequate nutrition as a determinant not only of good
physical health but also of full intellectual development and educational achievement, with adequate nutrition in the earliest months
and years being particularly important."5 9 The same department
has also been mandated to "maintain a program for the prevention
"
of blindness." 6
Federal legislative and regulatory policy is also patterned on a
voluntary, noncoercive, and nondirective approach. For example,
federal enactments provide financial assistance to states for several
purposes: (1) To assure certain mothers and children "access to
quality maternal and child health services"; 6 1 (2) to reduce the "incidence of preventable diseases and handicapping conditions among

children.

.

.";62

and (3) to develop "counseling and testing programs

and other programs for the diagnosis, control, and treatment of genetic diseases."'63 States receiving such assistance generally cannot
compel participation in programs supported by federal funding. 64
55. Id. § 13-109(f)(3).
56. Id. § 13-109(g)(2)(i). See also Note, A Preferencefor Nonexitence." Wrongful

Life and a Proposed Tort of Genetic Malpractice, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 477, 498-500 (1982).
57. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 150-155 (West 1979 & Supp. 1982).
58. Id. § 311 (West Supp. 1982).
59. Id. § 310 (West 1979). Notwithstanding this finding, theoprogram appears voluntary. /d. (suggesting the program has "potential" to reach all pregnant women).
60. Id. § 428. See also id. §§ 289-289.6 (West Supp. 1982) (program addressing
special needs of women likely to deliver, inter alia, disabled newborns).
61. 42 U.S.C.A. § 70(a)(1) (West Supp. 1975-1981).
62. Id. § 701(a)(2).
63. Id. § 300b-I (West 1982).
64. Id. § 247b(g)(2) (programs of federally supported state preventive health services must be voluntary); id. § 300b-2 (voluntary participation for those in subsidized ge-
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However encouraging one finds the recent advances toward further research, counseling, and testing on preventable handicaps, and
however laudable one finds recent advances in the compensation
and deterrence-based rules promoting handicap prevention,
lawmakers must begin to consider more direct, coherent, and comprehensive laws promoting the avoidance and elimination of handicaps to newborns. Certain laws can be implemented today because
of recently-developed scientific and medical understanding. Although other laws must await further developments, they must presently be discussed in the abstract so that when a proper
understanding is achieved, the time lag or period of "maladjustment" will be as brief as possible.
IV.

DIRECT, COHERENT AND ADEQUATE LAWS ON PREVENTING
HANDICAPS TO NEWBORNS

A.

Direct Laws

Laws promoting the prevention of handicaps to newborns are
often indirect, in that one of their central aims is not maintenance of
a duty to the newborn to prevent handicaps. Instead, the laws focus
on the maintenance of a duty to undertake reasonable conduct toward others. Both tort and criminal laws reflect this indirect tack,
and cases involving their implementation demonstrate that the laws
often fail to promote prevention of handicaps to newborns without
justification.
An apt illustration in tort law is found in the 1977 Illinois
Supreme Court decision in Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital.65 The
case involved allegations that a hospital and its director of laboratories had on two occasions negligently transfused a thirteen year old
girl with Rh-positive blood, which was incompatible with and which
netic diseases programs); Maternal and Child Health and Crippled Children's Services,
42 C.F.R. § 51a.120 (1980) (acceptance of family planning services under plans for maternal and child health are voluntary); Project Grants for Genetic Diseases Testing and
Counseling Programs, 42 C.F.R. § 51f.106(a)(l)(iii) (1982) (project grants for genetic diseases testing and counseling programs must be provided for all persons concerned about

having, or being carriers of, any genetic diseases). On the funding of genetic diseases

programs, see Note, supra note 7, at 918. On the possibility of mandatory participation
in federally supported programs, see S. REP. No. 860, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprintedin
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 9134, 9168; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE

STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SCREENING AND COUNSELING FOR GENETIC CONDITIONS 11-15-11-17 (1982).

On the constitutional problems posed by mandatory screening, see Note, supra note 7.
65. 67 I11.
2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977).
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sensitized her Rh-negative blood. 66 Further, the case involved allegations that defendants discovered that they had administered the
incompatible blood, but at no time had notified the girl's mother or
family.6 7 The girl first learned that her blood had been sensitized
over eight years later, when a routine blood screening was ordered
by a physician in the course of prenatal care. 68 A short time later she
learned of the sensitization and allegedly, as the result of such sensitization, she delivered a child that was jaundiced and suffering from
hyperbilirubinemia. It was alleged that the child had suffered permanent brain and nervous system damage as the result of defendants' acts. 69 The Supreme Court of Illinois found that the child
stated a cause of action against defendants, finding them potentially
liable to a person whose existence was not apparent at the time of the
70
acts.
The court's finding that the child possessed a cause of action
promoted the prevention of handicaps indirectly rather than directly.
Stated as part of the court's holding was the fact that the child has "a
right to be born free from prenatal injuries forseeably caused by a
breach of duty to the child's mother. '' 7 ' Of course, the recognition of
a duty to the mother is based on the policy that one who acts unreasonably to a living patient in providing medical services should compensate the patient for unreasonable acts. The court did not find a
72
duty owed to the child, regardless of any duty owed to its mother.
Had it been recognized by the court, this independent duty would
have been direct, based on the policy that in certain situations a duty
to act so as to prevent handicaps at birth is owed to the unborn.
An illustration of indirect reasoning in criminal law is the series
of state supreme court cases disallowing prosecutions for the intentional murder of a fertilized, implanted fetus where the criminal de66.
67.

Id. at 349, 367 N.E.2d at 1251.
Id.

70.
71.
72.

Id. at 357, 367 N.E.2d at 1255, 1256.
Id.
Compare the opinions of Justice Moran. id.. (discussion of "transferred negli-

68.
69.

Id.
Id.

gence" and "derivative actions") with the opinion of Justice Dooley. id. at 366. 367

N.E.2d at 1259 (discussion of legal rights of unborn, with no indication they are dependent on rights of Mother. or derivative). See also Robertson. Toward RationalBoundaries
of Tort Liability for Injur'r to the Unborn: PrenatalInjuries. Preconception Injuries and
Wrongful Life, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1401, 1417 ("[blut whether liability was based on an
independent duty to this 'separate organism' or on a contingent duty that matured when
the infant was born alive has never been made clear in many jurisdictions").
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fendant was not involved in a consensual abortion3 3 In each of the
cases, the court held that the fetus was not a person within the meaning of the state's homicide statute. 74 Although the defendant could
still be prosecuted for various crimes involving the pregnant woman
as the victim, these prosecutions would only indirectly promote the
prevention of handicaps to newborns. The strength of this promotion would be lessened because the harm to the prospective mother is
often far less serious than the harm to her fetus. Thus, these indirect
prosecutions-if initiated-would encompass crimes such as aborbattery; crimes that carry less severe penalties than
tion, assault, and
75
homicide.
does
A partial explanation of the indirect nature of laws promoting
handicap prevention may lie in a misunderstanding of the Supreme
Court of the United States' decisions in Roe v. Wade, which addresses the legal status of the unborn26 One California appellate
court affirmed the dismissal of a homicide prosecution of a defend73. People v. Greer, 79 11. 2d 103, 402 N.E.2d 203 (1980); State v. Brown, 378 So.
2d 916 (La. 1979); State v. Anderson, 135 N.J. Super. 423, 343 A.2d 505 (Law Div. 1975);
State v. Larsen, 578 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1978). See also People v. Guthrie, 97 Mich. App.
226, 293 N.W.2d 775 (1980) (dismissing a charge of negligent homicide where the victim
was a fetus "ready for birth," while calling the born-alive rule "archaic"). But see IOWA
CODE ANN. § 707.7 (West 1979) (noting feticide involves the intentional termination of a
human pregnancy after the second trimester); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.00 (McKinney
1975) (defining homicide as including death of an unborn child of more than twenty-four
weeks); R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-23-5 (1981) (willful killing of an unborn quick child in
certain circumstances is manslaughter). See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp.
1982) (a parent's failure to provide necessities for a minor child is a misdemeanor, and a
"child conceived but not yet born is to be deemed an existing person").
74. People v. Greer, 79 111.2d 103, 116, 402 N.E.2d 203, 209 (1980); State v. Brown,
378 So. 2d 916, 918 (La. 1979); State v. Anderson, 135 N.J. Super. 423, 429, 343 A.2d 505.
509 (Law Div. 1975) (fetuses found to be victims of murder for they were born alive and
then died); State v. Larsen, 578 P.2d 1280, 1282 (Utah 1978).
75. For a review of available Louisiana criminal law after State v. Brown, 378 So.
2d 916 (La. 1979), see Parness & Pritchard, To Be Or Not To Be: Protectingthe Unborn's
Potentiality of Life, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 257, 269-70 (1982). Even where state criminal
laws appear direct in that fetuses are potential victims of homicidal acts, punishment for
killing a fetus is often far less severe than punishment for killing a person born alive:
nonviable fetuses may not be included as victims of crime-even where the actor is not
the mother; and the legislative goal may not have been the protection of the fetus' potentiality for life. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00, 125.45 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1982-1983)
(acts causing miscarriage in third trimester prompt a maximum sentence of only seven
years in prison); Note, The Law and the Unborn Child: The Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 349,364 (1971); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150-52 (1973)
(each noting uncertainty regarding original purpose of early abortion statutes-protection of the mother or the child).
76. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (declaring the Texas statutory scheme regulating abortion
to be unconstitutional because of its restrictions on women's constitutionally protected
right to privacy).
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ant who had allegedly killed a previable human fetus although the
criminal statute defined homicide as "the unlawful killing of a
human being, or a fetus."" The court failed to implement the statute because of its reading of Roe:
The underlying rationale of Wade, therefore, is that until viability
is reached, human life in the legal sense has not come into existence. Implicit in Wade is the conclusion that as a matter of constitutional law the destruction of a non-viable fetus is not the taking
of'human life. It follows that such destruction cannot constitute
committed by a
murder or other form of homicide, whether
7
mother, a father (as here), or a third person. 8
The California court clearly misread Roe. In Roe, the Supreme
Court held only that a previable fetus was not a "person" enjoying
fourteenth amendment protection 79 and specifically refused to resolve the difficult question of when life begins.80 In fact, the high
court noted that while they are treated differently under the law than
living persons, the unborn have been accorded certain legal rights.8 '
In a later case involving the term "dependent child," which is found
in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program
of the Social Security Act,8 2 the high court determined whether the
term encompassed the unborn without even referring to its treatment
83
of the unborn in Roe.
Is there more than a semantic difference between indirect and
direct promotion of handicap prevention in, for example, a Renslow
setting, where a girl was born handicapped as the result of a defendant's preconception negligent conduct toward the girl's mother?
Surely there is, if the mother's contributory negligence causes there
77.

People v. Smith, 59 Cal. App. 3d 751, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1976) (construing

187 (West 1982 Supp.)).
78. Id. at 757, 129 Cal. Rptr. at 502. For failure to implement wrongful death act
because of misreading of Roe, see Toth v. Goree, 65 Mich. App. 296, 300, 237 N.W.2d
297, 301 (1975); Wallace v. Wallace, 120 N.H. 675, 678, 421 A.2d 134, 137 (1980).
79. 410 U.S. at 156-57.
80. Id. at 159 ("[w]hen those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in
the development of man's knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.").
81. Id. at 161 ("the law has been reluctant ... to accord legal rights to the unborn
except in narrowly defined situations and except when the rights are contingent upon live
CAL. PENAL CODE §

birth").
82. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
83. Burns v. Alcala. 420 U.S. 575 (1975). The determination was based on inquiries into the legislative language, the legislative history, and the administrative practice
pursuant to the legislation. Id. at 578-79, 581-82, 584-86.
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to be no breach of duty to the girl. 84 Similarly, damages might differ
if there were two distinct duties, one owing to the mother and another to the girl. 85 Moreover, a duty to prevent handicaps could be
assessed against the mother in the girl's favor in a more direct setting.8 6 Finally, application of the crucial "foreseeability" criterion
might differ, as the forseeability of someone being harmed by the
negligent performance of medical services on behalf of another differs from the forseeability of someone other than a living person who
is the recipient of medical services. This final difference is not with87
out significance outside the realm of tort law.
In part, the contemporary failure to recognize the duty to prevent handicaps might originate from the general discomfort that exists with regard to many of the issues implicit in discussions of such a
duty. To what extent do prospective parents have a duty to their
84. Supra note 72. Seealso Fallaw v. Hobbs, 113 Ga. App. 181, 184-85. 147 S.E.2d
517. 520 (1966) (pregnant woman's negligence is not imputable to her child who sues a
second tortfeasor for injuries caused while inutero based on a Georgia statute which
states that parental fault is not imputable to the child). See also City of Louisville v.
Stuckenborg, 438 S.W.2d 94, 97 (Ky. 1969) (contributory negligence of pregnant woman
leading to her child's death shortly after birth not imputable to her husband who sues
under a wrongful death act for the loss of his child).
85. For example, differences would arise in a comparative negligence jurisdiction
where the negligence of the mother might be imputed to the girl if no independent duty
to the girl is established. Fallaw v. Hobbs, 113 Ga. App. 181, 184-85, 147 S.E.2d 517, 520
(1966). As well, differing damages might reasonably flow or be foreseeable from a doctor's breach of a duty to provide reasonable health care to a girl or woman who is a
potential mother than from a doctor's breach of a duty to undertake reasonable conduct
toward the potential offspring of a female patient. To date, the breach of the duty owed
to a mother has often led to recovery by an afterborn child for the child's birth with
disabilities caused by prenatal injuries, with no discussion of any distinct duty to the
mother's unborn child. 67 111.2d at 358, 367 N.E.2d at 1255. But see Hughson v. St.
Francis Hosp. of Port Jervis, 9 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2351 (N.Y. App. Div. Mar. 9. 1983).
Compare Hughes v. Hutt, 455 A.2d 623 (Pa. 1983) (woman's deception regarding her use
of birth control held not to be a defense to an afterborn child's paternity suit).
86. If distinct duties were found owed by the defendant to both the mother and the
girl. then later establishment of some duty (presumably within federal constitutional limits regarding childbearing and childrearing) owed the girl from her mother would be
easier (presumably after the elimination of a parental immunity barrier). For some
thoughts on a potential parent's duty to future offspring, see Dinsdale, Child v. Parent: .4
Viable New Tort of Wrongful Life?, 24 ARIZ. L. REv. 391 (1982); Robertson. supra note
66, at 1413: Comment. Parental Liabiitfor Prenatal lnjurv, 14 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PRoBs. 47 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Parental Liabilit,]: Comment. Preconception Negligence: Reconciling an Emerging Tort, 67 GEo. L.J. 1239. 1260-61 (1979) [hereinafter
cited as Preconception Negligence].
87. Consider the law regarding third party beneficiaries to contracts. Comment,
Third Party Beneficiaries and the Restatement (Secondi of Contracts. 67 CORNELL L. REV.
880 (1982).
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unborn children?8 8 When should the law presume that prospective
parents' decisions are consistent with their future offsprings' best interests? 9 To what extent can the state intrude upon living persons'
decisions which will, or may, have negative impact on the unborn? 90
When, if ever, should the laws recognize certain potential persons'
interests in not being born due to the prospect of severe handicaps? 9 '
88. See King, The Juridical Status of the Fetus.- A Proposalfor Legal Protection of
the Unborn, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1647, 1678, 1682-83 (1979) (suggesting maternal responsibility can only be fully assessed after fetal viability); Comment, Parental LiabilitY, supra
note 86, at 85-87 (suggesting a "reasonably prudent expecting parent standard," which is
to be maintained only after the parents were aware or had reason to be aware of the
pregnancy---even if awareness predated the fetus' viability); Comment; Preconception
Negligence, supra note 86, at 1260-61 (suggesting recognition of claims by children
against their parents for prenatal or preconception negligence would be desirable, but
that such recognition awaits substantial statutory or common law development).
89. With respect to children who are born, it has been strongly urged that the presumption of consistency be maintained unless there appears a substantial risk that the
child will imminently suffer a physical harm that will cause serious injury. See Comment. Constitutional Limitations on State Intervention in Prenatal Care, 67 VA. L. REV.
1051, 1062-64 (1981). But see Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 604 (1974) (no absolute
parental right to institutionalize a living child). Regarding unborn children, the risk of
physical harm standard may not be relevant to prospective parents' decisions regarding
their future offspring. Constitutional Limitations on State Intervention in Parental Care,
67 VA. L. REV. 1051, 1064-67 (1982) (suggesting a balancing-of-interests approach is necessary to assure no undue state interference with the various privacy rights involved in
prenatal health care). See also Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978) (finding
natural father of an illegitimate child need not be given the same authority to block an
adoption by a stepfather as the law gives a divorced father because the natural father was
assumed to have never shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily
supervision, education, protection, or care of the child): Justus v. Atchison. 19 Cal. 3d
564. 581. 565 P.2d 122, 133, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 108 (1977) (distinguishing between harm
to parents caused by death of a born child and by death of a fetus).
90. There is precedent for state intrusion when pregnant womens' desires about
health care run contrary to both their own and their fetus' interests. See, e.g., Jefferson v.
Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457 (1981) (medical procedures ordered for pregnant woman over her religious objections in a situation where
there was a 99-100% chance of fetal death and 50% chance of maternal death without
them. and nearly a 100% chance that both would survive with them): Raleigh Fitkin-Paul
Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, cert. denied, 377 U.S.
985 (1964) (over religious objections, viable fetus' and mother's lives would be saved by
order of blood transfusions). Yet, to date, states have done far less to protect the unborn
when maternal health is not an issue and where there are not life-threatening circumstances facing the unborn. See, e.g., Baby X. v, Misiano, 373 Mass. 265, 366 N.E.2d 755
(1977) (father's duty to support child did not encompass an unborn fetus): In re Dittrick
Infant. 80 Mich. App. 219, 263 N.W.2d 37 (1977) (Probate Code not read to grant the
unborn the protections of child custody laws, though amendments to the Code allowing
such a reading were desirable).
91. Some would say never. See, e.g., Phillips v. U.S.. 508 F. Supp. 537, 543 (D.S.C.
1980): Berman v. Allen. 80 N.J. 421,425. 404 A.2d 8. 12 (1979). Contra. Turpin. 643 P,2d
at 962-64, 183 Cal. Rptr. at 345-46: Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., No. 48331-1 (Wash.
Sup. Ct. Jan. 6. 1983) (following Turpin). See also Dinsdale. supra note 79, at 419 (the
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Notwithstanding the discomfort with many of the relevant issues, the time is ripe to explore the means by which laws can more
directly prevent handicaps to newborns. Little discomfort should be
felt in implementing many necessary changes. For example, it
should be easy to recognize in both tort and criminal law a duty to
undertake reasonable conduct toward unborn who are clearly forseeable to the actor and whose interests are not in conflict with the interests of any others touched by the actor. Thus, one who counsels
or medically treats a woman who is seeking to bear a normal and
healthy child should owe a duty both to the woman and her unborn
offspring. 92 The scenario is not much different from a new mother
seeking a well baby checkup for her newborn. By this standard one
who intentionally assaults a visibly pregnant woman without her
consent should be deemed to be acting criminally against both the
woman and her fetus.
Somewhat more discomfort is felt with other possible changes.
For example, if a duty to undertake reasonable conduct toward the
unborn be recognized in tort law, then should that duty encompass
those who cannot clearly forsee the unborn, 93 or those who have
conflicting responsibilities to one or both of the unborn's potential
parents?94 And, if such a duty is at times recognized, where should
rational distinctions be drawn between instances where there is and
is not a duty?9 5 Further, how far should the courts go in drawing
such distinctions before the legislature is called upon to continue the
task of line drawing? 96 Finally, to what extent may proof of fault in
tort litigation be unnecessary where claimants seek compensation for
imposition of parental duty to abort is unwarranted and suggestive of Orwellian
genetics).
92. Because of the presumption that parents act in their offspring's best interests, a
conflict between duty to parent and child might only arise if the parent were abusive or
neglectful. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979).
93. Courts recognizing child's claims for preconception torts at times seemingly
require foreseeability of some form of harm to some future person. Renslow, 67 111.2d at
357, 364-65, 367 N.E.2d at 1255, 1258 (Dobley, J., concurring). But see Turpin, 643 P.2d
at 956, 960, 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 339, 343, 348 (requiring a "but for" test in a child's
preconception tort claim where negligent diagnosis of one child by a speech and hearing
specialist led to the birth of a second child).
94. Consider an employer who has a duty not to engage in sex discrimination, but
who operates a facility posing health dangers only to the future offspring of female employees. For a suggested solution to this tension between prospective mothers and their
offspring, see Furnish, supra note 47, at 115.
95. Renslow. 67 I11.
2d at 357, 367 N.E.2d at 1255.
96. Jorgensen, 483 F.2d at 240-41.
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handicaps resulting from defendants' prenatal acts?9 7
In criminal law similar issues give rise to heightened discomfort.
Should it be a crime against the fetus for one to harm unintentionally a visibly pregnant woman's fetus, with or without maternal consent?98 And, should it be a crime against the unborn to trigger the
potentiality of handicaps at birth, perhaps where subsequent birth
and even conception is uncertain and where the prospective parent
or parents accede to the triggering acts?99 Finally, to what extent
should prospective parents be made responsible under criminal law
for conduct which does, or may, lead to birth handicaps of their
offspring?10o
In discussing these more discomforting issues, a recognition of
the need for intricate linedrawing must be maintained. In tort law,
the "specter of successive generations of plaintiffs complaining
against a single defendant for harm caused by genetic damage done
an ancestor in a nuclear accident," or of "perpetual claims arising
from chemical accident or long-term radiation exposure," may be
troublesome to many who are sympathetic to the unborn 0 I and may
require intricate linedrawing. Equally troubling are questions regarding the extent to which a prospective parent or parents can be
made defendants in tort actions initiated on behalf of their offspring 0 2 and regarding prenatal parental conduct. 0 3 The partial or
complete abrogation of parental immunity in suits by children involving postnatal conduct suggests that state policy often supports
initiation of suits based -on prenatal conduct.'0 4
97. Id. at 241 (father whose twin daughters' Mongoloidism was caused by the defendant's oral contraceptive product had strict liability claim under Oklahoma law).
. 98. Consider, for example, the serious harm resulting from a pregnant woman's
participation in a touch football game---or perhaps her being struck by an errant football
as she strolled in the park. If the foregoing prompts a quick and simple negative response, does such a response continue if one assumes some negligent--or grossly negligent--conduct?
99. Consider, for example, the possible criminal liability for the harm caused by an
employer's maintenance of a toxic workplace. See Furnish, supra note 47.
100. For a possible case, see Parness & Pritchard, supra note 75, at 297.
101. Renslow, 67 111.2d at 357, 367 N.E.2d at 1255.
102.- For a review of the practical difficulties with such suits, see Comment, Parental Liability,supra note 86, at 88-89.
103. One author has concluded gross negligence is the point at which a woman's
right to control freely her own body should be subordinated to the unborn child's right to
begin life with a sound mind and body. Note, Recoveryfor Prenatal Injuries The Right
ofa Child Against Its Mother, 10 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 582, 609 (1976). See also supra
note 88.
104. After reviewing the erosion of the parent-child tort immunity doctrine, one
author concluded:
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In criminal laws under which the unborn can be victims the issue is the criminal's familiarity with the existence of a fetus or with
the potentiality for parenthood of one with whom the criminal deals.
It may be unfair to charge with crimes all those who cause physical
or mental handicaps to newborns, even where their action is socially
undesirable.10 5 For example, it may be unreasonable to charge with
assault one who causes severe physical or mental handicaps to a
newborn whose pregnant mother was involved in otherwise noncriminal "horseplay" with the would-be defendant, at least where
neither the would-be defendant nor the mother knew during their
play of the pregnancy. Thus, as in tort law, linedrawing in criminal
law is necessary. Just as in tort law, problems regarding prenatal
parental conduct subject to criminal sanction arise in crimes against
the unborn, though precedent for parental culpability exists in some
states.106
As compared with state laws involving children born alive, laws
involving prenatal conduct by possible parents seemingly trigger not
only differing perspectives of reasonable parental conduct or legitimate exclusive areas of parental authority and discretion, 0 7 but also
Thus, over the past fifteen years an increasing number of state courts have abrogated. either partially or entirely, the parental immunity doctrine. Given this
growing recognition of parental liability for negligent injury to minor children
and the universally recognized liability of third parties for prenatal injury, an
action by the child against its parents for negligent prenatal injury seems to be
both logically consistent with current trends in the law and just. In the absence
of other prevailing considerations, it appears that the child's cause of action
should lie.
Comment, ParentalLiabilit),supra note 86, at 72. See, e.g., Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich.
App. 396. 301 N.W.2d 869 (1980).
105. Of course, liability in tort can extend far beyond liability in criminal law in an
effort to deter, as well as compensate for, socially undesirable conduct. Both federal
constitutional protections and legitimate state policy considerations support a finding of
unfairness in criminal law with no corresponding finding in tort law. Consider, for example, the differing treatment afforded slightly negligent acts by criminal and tort law (is
the eighth amendment relevant?).
106. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1982) (parental failure to provide necessities to a minor child is a misdemeanor, and a "child conceived but not yet born is to be
deemed an existing person"): IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.7 (West 1979) ("any person" who
intentionally terminates or tries to terminate a human pregnancy after the end of the
second trimester is guilty of a felony, except where a physician acts to preserve the life of
the pregnant woman): N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.50. 125.55 (McKinney 1975) (self-abortion in two degrees, wherein only one requires a resulting miscarriage but wherein both
relate to maternal acts and are deemed misdemeanors).
107. While some states abrogating parental tort immunity have adopted only a
reasonable parent standard, others have retained immunity for acts involving certain exercises of parental authority and discretion. Compare Gibson v. Gibson. 3 Cal. 3d 914.
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differing federal constitutional concerns regarding childrearing. 08o
Parental childrearing interests rather than childbearing interests
seem implicated, for in most tort and criminal law settings the prospective parents' acts come only after a determination has been made
to bear a child. Where prospective parents' acts precede any determination to bear or beget, the acts are also typically unrelated to the
decision to bear or beget and, at most, relate to decisions regarding
childrearing. For example, a woman who takes heroin, knowing
herself to be pregnant and to be desirous of bearing a child, could be
deemed to have undertaken both the tortious and criminal conduct
toward her unborn child.' 0 9 As well, a male with recognized
childbearing potential, who consistently enters a workplace where
significant exposure to vinyl chloride or lead is assured, could be
deemed to have undertaken both tortious and criminal conduct toward his unborn child."10
In conclusion, it can be said that when exploring the means
through which laws can more directly prevent handicaps to
newborns, constant reminders of several major themes would greatly
facilitate the inquiry. An understanding of these themes will assist in
the resolution of the less complex issues presented and properly focus attention on the more difficult ones. These themes involve the
479 P.2d 648 (1971). 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, with Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d
193 (1963).
108. Regarding parental rights to rear their children, the United States Supreme
Court has said: "It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child
reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." Prince v. Commonwealth. 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1943). Yet, parental authority is not absolute. The Court has recognized that
the state as parens patriae can act to guard the general interest in youth's well being, and
thus can restrict parental decision-making in such matters as school attendance and child
labor. Id See also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979) ("a state is not without
control over parental discretion in dealing with children when their physical or mental
health is jeopardized").
109. A pregnant woman's use of heroin seemingly has little to do with her constitutionally protected decision to bear or beget children. 410 U.S. at 153. Yet, her heroin use
can cause severe adverse effects for her unborn child's physical or mental health. In re
John Children, 61 Misc. 2d 347, 354-56, 306 N.Y.S.2d 797, 806-07 (1969). It would thus
be legitimate for the state as parens patriae to act to guard the unborn child's well being.
Infra note 116.
110. For example, the exposure of a male of childbearing capacity to repeated and
significant doses of certain substances typically has little to do with any childbearing
decision: but again, a future child's physical or mental health can be severely impaired.
Howard. Hazardous Substances in the Workplace. Implications for the Emplo'ment Rights
of Women, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 798, 803-05 (1981) (such substances may well include lead
and vinyl chloride).
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legitimacy of state protection of the unborn and state characterizations of the unborn as persons.
First, the state has legitimate interests in preventing handicaps
to newborns caused by prenatal conduct, notwithstanding what appears to many as a lack of respect for the unborn in the Roe decision.
In fact, the Roe court expressly recognized this realm of governmental power by indicating that Texas had an "important and legitimate
interest in protecting the potentiality of life"" I' and by referring with
approval to state laws seeking to improve the unborn's quality of life
after birth." 2 The Court has reaffirmed its view on the legitimacy of
such power since Roe in a case involving alleged welfare benefits for
3
the unborn." 1
Second, notwithstanding the decision in Roe, the unborn can be
viewed under many laws as "persons" deserving of certain legal
rights and protections. While "the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense,"" 4 and will probably
never be so viewed,"t 5 there is much the state can do legitimately to
directly promote the unborns' interest in achieving their potentiality
for life without any accompanying physical or mental handicaps." 16
In particular, the unborn can be more fully recognized as being "persons" directly affected by both tortious and criminal conduct, and
thus as being appropriate plaintiffs in tort litigation and victims in
criminal prosecution.
B.

Coherent Laws

Laws promoting the prevention of handicaps to newborns are
sometimes incoherent in that they further such underlying purposes
as compensation and deterrence in an unequal way, with random
ill. 410 U.S. at 162.
112. Id. at 161-62 (referring to laws on inheritance and other means of transferring
property, as well as laws allowing compensation in tort). And see Parness, Social Commentary. Values andLegalPersonhood,83 W. VA. L. REV. 487, 498 (1981) (abortion is at
times viewed as promoting the unborn's quality of life).
113. Bums, 420 U.S. at 583 (Title V of the Social Security Act explicitly provides
for monetary assistance to expectant mothers who are desirous of purchasing adequate
medical care for unborn children).
114, 410 U.S. at 162.
115. Parness, supra note 112, at 503 (in a clash of values involving protection of
potential human life, promotion of individual freedom, and furtherance of the overall
quality of life, the unborn's interests will sometimes be undermined).
116. In Roe, the Court found the states had an "important and legitimate interest
in protecting the potentiality of human life." 410 U.S. at 162. This applies regardless of
whether the state's interest was founded on a theory that a new human life is present
from the moment of conception. Id. at 150.

19831

DUTY TO PREVENT HANDICAPS

rather than rational distinctions between what is prevented and who
is protected. Again, tort and criminal laws provide examples of such
incoherence.
In the area of tort law, compensation is sometimes awarded a
newborn and his family for injuries resulting from a defendant's acts
prior to the newborn's birth but after its conception, but not for injuries resulting from a defendant's preconception acts.' " 7 This distincAlso arbitrary is the distinction made in
tion seems arbitrary.'
wrongful death and survival claims between fetuses who incur defendant's harmful conduct and who die therefrom shortly after live
birth, and fetuses who incur a defendant's harmful conduct and who
are not born alive as a result." t9 In the latter setting, immediately
harmful acts upon a fetus are treated 20less harshly than acts taking
longer to produce the ultimate harm.
In criminal law, as noted earlier, the unborn often go unnoticed
117. Compare Albala v. City of New York. 54 N.Y.2d 269, 429 N.E.2d 786, 445
N.Y.S.2d 108 (1981) (disallowing recovery for preconception acts) with Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478, 248 N.E.2d 901, 905, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1969) (allowing recovery for
postconception acts, as long as child is born alive).
118. In drawing the distinction between preconception and postconception acts
preceding birth, one court expressed concern that nonartificial and nonarbitrary lines
could not be rationally drawn by the courts between certain preconception acts and
others-though it hinted that the legislature might be capable of such linedrawing. Albala v. City of New York, 54 N.Y.2d 269, 273, 429 N.E.2d 786, 788, 445 N.Y.S.2d 108,
110(1981). Such an expression fails to legitimize, however, judicial distinctions between
preconception and postconception acts prior to birth. Similarly "staggering implications" and "unlimited hypotheses" accompany the necessary distinctions between certain
postconception but prebirth acts and others. Id. at 273, 429 N.E.2d at 788, 445 N.Y.S.2d
at 110. As well, the court was concerned over the impact of encouraging "defensive
medicine." Id. at 274, 429 N.E.2d at 788, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 110. Yet, whatever it meant
by "defensive medicine," the case was an easy one for it concerned preconception acts
that were not only harmful to the later-born child, but also were negligent and harmful to
the child's mother. 1d. at 271, 429 N.E.2d at 787, 445 N.Y.S.2d at 109. Thus, the case did
not involve a scenario wherein the duty owed to the woman conflicted in any way with
any duty found to be owing to her potential offspring.
119. For a defense of this born alive rule, both where the death is and is not directly caused by the tortfeasor, see Robertson, supra note 72, at 1420-34. Yet, it seems
that compensation even where no live birth followed would not be a "windfall"; would
help compensate parents, at the least, for "sentimental loss"; and could be reconciled
with Roe, in that the tortfeasor's acts (unlike a woman's) neither trigger any constitutional protections nor promote any legitimate social values. Id. at 1429-30, 1434 n.184.
Another arbitrary distinction in the wrongful death act area involves the viability requirement. Id. at 1419 (previability injury should be treated similarly to postviability
injury).
120. Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 18-19. 148
N.W.2d 107, 110 (1967). This does not suggest, however, that damages will necessarily.
or even usually, be more substantial in cases involving stillbirth than in cases involving
birth with handicaps.
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in the law as victims. 12' Yet even where the unborn are recognized
as victims of crime, irrational differentiations are sometimes made
between one form of criminal conduct and another. For example,
while California does proscribe in its murder statute the nonconsensual killing of a fetus, its manslaughter statute does not so proscribe. 122 In Mississippi 123 and Rhode Island, 124 manslaughter
includes only the willful killing of an unborn quick child, apparently
125
failing to recognize nonquickened fetuses as victims.
As with the need for more direct laws preventing handicaps to
newborns, the exploration of the means necessary to create more coherent laws will cause some discomfort and should be guided by the
understanding that the state can legitimately protect the unborn in
many settings by deeming them to be persons worthy of legal rights
and protections. Little discomfort should be felt in implementing
many necessary changes to eliminate differentiations among the
born, unborn, and varying types of unborn. Thus, one whose acts
impact upon a person of childbearing capacity may be deemed to
owe that person's potential offspring some duty to exercise due care,
regardless of whether the person is pregnant or at the viability stage
of a pregnancy. Further, one who intentionally assaults a visibly
pregnant woman without her consent should be deemed to be acting
criminally against the fetus, regardless of fetal viability, the subsequent live birth of the fetus, or the nature of the injury to the fetus.
As there are no constitutionally-protected privacy rights regarding
assaults against the unborn, there is no reason why one causing a still
birth should be treated differently than one whose acts cause a newborn to expire after a very short afterbirth life.126 Similarly there is
no reason why one whose prenatal acts caused a newborn serious
physical and mental handicaps should be treated differently than
still born or a newborn
one whose prenatal acts caused a fetus to be
27
to expire after a very short afterbirth life.'
121. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
122. Comment, Feticide inCalifornia.4 Proposed Statutor Scheme, 12 U.C.D. L.

REV. 723, 725 (1979).
123. MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-37 (1972).
124. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-5 (1981).
125. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.010 (1981)

(forbidding certain operations
seeking to terminate the "pregnancy of a nonviable fetus"), and consider whether even
that statute has the nonquickened fetus as a victim. See also Roe. 410 U.S. at 151.
126. The distinction has been made, but was unsupported by reasons other than
the common law tradition and the lack of a clear legislative intent to overturn such a
practice. State v. Anderson, 135 N.J. Super. 423, 428, 343 A.2d 505. 508-09 (Law Div.
1975).
127. Id.
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Adequate Laws

Even with more direct and more coherent laws providing better
compensation in tort and greater deterrence through criminal sanction, laws promoting the prevention of handicaps to newborns still
would be inadequate if they operated only after the onset of the
handicaps sought to be prevented. In situations where preventable
handicapping conditions appear, the law does little to assist in the
avoidance or elimination of the future newborn's handicaps. The
laws' failure in this regard is particularly troublesome in circumstances where any litigation in tort is not likely to result in significant
compensation for loss 2 8 and where the criminal law may not
29
operate.
There are several circumstances' in which contemporary law
might be deemed inadequate. One such circumstance arises where a
person is about to commit a tortious or criminal act likely to produce
handicaps to a newborn and the law disallows injunctive relief to bar
such an act.' 30 Another circumstance might be where large numbers
of entities are preparing to act in a way likely to produce handicaps
in newborns, with any prospect of later assessment of individual responsibility highly unlikely.13' Yet another might be where the individuals responsible for some forseeable future persons' birth
handicaps are not likely to be around when the handicapped
32
newborns appear.
Contemporary law may be able to provide more adequate protection of newborns from physical and mental handicaps in several
ways. Part of the answer lies in the more immediate use of medical
128. For example, compensation may not be forthcoming where parental tort immunity exists; where industry-wide acts preclude one from demonstrating any necesary
link between injury and a particular actor; and where the time lag between act and resulting handicap is long enough that the actor can no longer be found, at least with
money.
129. For example, it may be found to be noncriminal to cause injury recklessly, at
least where the actor was unaware of the link between act and injury; or to cause injury
intentionally, at least where public policy supports noninfringement on prospective parents' freedoms through the absence of criminal'sanctions beyond those generally applicable to the populace.
130. For example, an unborn may not be a "person" entitled to bring suit on its
own behalf. Similarly, an unborn may not be able to show irreparable harm based on a
non-life-threatening handicap.
131. Later assessment is often unlikely because of an inability to match injuries to
acts of a particular entity. See supra note 45.
132. See, e.g., 67 111.2d at 376-77, 367 N.E.2d at 1264 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (suggesting up to thirty-seven years could have passed between defendant's action and plaintifis handicap).
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and scientific advances regarding the unborn to promote the further
federal regulatory protection of the unborn, together with the expansion of state child support, abuse, and custody laws and the possible
imposition of mandatory screening and procreation laws, which are
scientifically and morally justifiable. Certainly necessary are the
traditional legal protections, usually encompassing tort and criminal
law, together with financial support promoting medical and scientific
research, the free flow of information to whomever is interested, and
voluntary screening for certain hereditary disorders. But they are
inadequate during an era when significant. new insights into the
causes of handicaps at birth are commonplace.
1. FederalRegulatory Protection
To date, as a result of conflicting and ambiguous statutory mandates, federal regulatory protection of the unborn has been spotty
and is often founded on rather precarious ground. Further protection would be possible if delegations of authority to federal agencies
were more harmonious and more explicit regarding the agency's
duty to safeguard the unborn.
One illustration of seemingly conflicting mandates is the interface between the responsibilities under the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) in a work environment potentially toxic to fetuses. The employer controlling
such an environment has the duty to comply with the standards of
the Secretary of Labor under OSHA, which ensure that "no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity." 3 3 Standards for occupational exposure to lead provide an
example of where "functional capacity" was read to include the capacity to produce healthy children 34 and thus, the promotion of fetal protection
led to differing treatment of pregnant
workplace. 3 5 Yet these standards have been found women in the
to be difficult to
reconcile with the 1978 Pregnancy Amendment to title VII of the
Civil Rights Act, 136 which states that "women affected by pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for
133.

29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976).

134. 43 Fed. Reg. 54,354, 54,421 (1978).
135. For a review of the standards for occupational exposure to lead, and a criticism thereof for not more fully ensuring prevention of fetal harm, see Furnish, supra note
47, at 70-74.
136. Act of Oct. 31, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (1976)). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. IV 1980).
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all employment-related purposes." 3 7 This difficulty has been recognized but can not be reconciled by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 38 Several suggestions on how harmony may be
achieved have recently been offered. 39 The problems revealed by
the foregoing conflict are compounded by certain ambiguities in the
relevant statutory language. For example, it has been suggested that
the Secretary of Labor's interpretation of "functional capacity" as
including the capacity to produce healthy children is erroneous.'14
An illustration of inadequate protection of the unborn resulting
from liberal delegation of congressional power can be found in Burns
v. Alcala. 14' In that case, the Supreme Court of the United State§
faced the question of whether states receiving federal financial aid
under the AFDC program 4 2 must offer welfare benefits to pregnant
women for their unborn children. 43 Viewing the issue solely as one
of statutory construction, ' the Court responded in the negative
after finding that the phrase "dependent children" did not encompass fetuses. 4 The Court noted that Congress had provided for
medical care to expectant mothers in another federally-funded program. I' 6 Yet that program was not mandatory upon the states providing welfare benefits to children. 47 The Court noted that
137.

Id.

138. Furnish, supra note 47, at 112-15.
139. Id. at 115-18; Williams, supra note 10, at 668-703; Howard, supra note 110, at
798. Of course, harmony can be further threatened if states decide to extend protections
beyond the parameters of federal law, finding no preemption. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 31-372(a) (West Supp. 1982) (labor commissioner can prompt occupational and health
standards "in special circumstances" where no federal standards are applicable); id.
§ 46a-60(a)(7) (deeming as a prohibited discriminatory employment practice an employer's failure to provide reasonable means for temporary work transfers for pregnant
women who believe continued employment in a position may cause injury to the fetus).

140. Comment, Birth Defects Causedby ParentalExposure to Workplace Hazards.The Interface of Title VII with OSHA and Tort Law, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 237, 249 n.72

(1979). But see Furnish, supra note 47, at 67. Another ambiguity might be in the general
duty clause of the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1)
(1976) (employer must maintain a workplace "free from recognized hazards that are
causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm"). See also Wright v. Olin,
51 U.S.L.W. 2390 (4th Cir. Dec. 23, 1982) (business necessity defense in Title VII actions
includes, under certain circumstances, fetal vulnerability program designed to protect the
unborn children of women workers from the hazards of the workplace).
141. 420 U.S. 575 (1975).
142. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
143. 420 U.S. at 576-77.
144. Id. at 577.
145. Id. at 580.
146. Id. at 583 n.10 (citing Wisdom v. Norton, 507 F.2d 750, 755 (2d Cir. 1974)).
147. The program came under Title V of the Social Security Act, appearing specifically in 42 U.S.C.A. § 708(a)(1) (West Supp. 1975-1981) ("necessary health care to pro-
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although the states had an option to claim federal matching funds
for AFDC payments to pregnant women, 48 thirty-four different
state plans under the AFDC program had been approved without
49
any aid to unborn children.
Given the express congressional concern with reducing "the incidence of preventable diseases and handicapping conditions among
children. . .,"50 further explicit delegations of regulatory authority
regarding the protection of the unborn are needed. For example, the
authority to promulgate labeling requirements might be delegated so
that consumers and others would have better access to information
regarding the potential harm to their offspring inherent in certain
products.' 5 ' Also, the prohibition of certain hazardous substances
might be broadened to include substances possessing the potential
although they
for significant harm to future generations of people,
52
pose little or no threat to the present populace.
2.

Child Support, Abuse and Custody Laws

As noted, the regulation of prenatal conduct by prospective parents in order to prevent birth handicaps offers differing parental perspectives than does the regulation of parental conduct involving
53
children who have truly gained a separate biological existence.
Additionally, the public policy perspectives are different in that there
are differing classes of people who are prospective parents, 54 differing constitutional values, 55 and differing health and safety considerations. 56 Nonetheless, prevailing child support, abuse, and custody
spective mothers"), and has been changed since then, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 701-709 (West
Supp. 1975-1981).
148.
149.
150.
151.

420 U.S. at 579.
Id. at 579-80 n.5 (citing Alcala v. Burns, 494 F.2d 743, 745 (8th Cir. 1974)).
42 U.S.C.A. § 701(a)(2) (West Supp. 1975-198 1).
For example, such warnings exist regarding the use of saccarin. See also 15

U.S.C.A. § 1333 (West 1982) (statutory, as opposed to regulatory, requirement regarding
labeling of a dangerous product).

152. Hazardous substances are prohibited by the Hazardous Substances Act, 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 1261-1276 (West 1982). Consider recent debates on genetic screening of
prospective employees. Goodrich, Are Your Genes Rightfor Your Job? 3 CAL. LAW. 24

(1983).

153. Supra note 113-114, and accompanying text.
154. Conceptually, most newborns are prospective parents, as are even the unborn
themselves. The major obstacle to regulating newborns and the unborn as prospective
parents is the lack of significant, relevant medical and scientific understanding.
155. Born children are persons entitled to fourteenth amendment protection, while
unborn children are not. 410 U.S. at 156-57.

156. Handicaps which are preventable after birth differ significantly from potential
birth handicaps preventable prior to birth. As well, the number and type of actors able to
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laws provide much insight into the available means of preventing
handicaps to newborns.
There is already some precedent for the quite simple proposition that "a child conceived but not yet born [is owed a duty by a
parent to furnish] necessary

. .

.

medical attendance or other reme-

dial care."'5 7 That proposition should be more universally adopted,
with civil actions on behalf of the unborn child available to enforce
this parental duty. 5 8 Enactment of the proposition in a criminal
code would trigger state action only after the opportunity to file civil
proceedings has passed and when the breach of duty may have already resulted in irreparable harm to the developing fetus.
Besides extending the parental duty to support to the furnishing
of necessities to conceived but unborn children, laws should also
protect the unborn from their prospective parents' abusive acts. Unlike the duty to support, a duty to refrain from abusive acts should
be owed by prospective parents to their unconceived, as well as conceived, unborn children. Enforcement of the duty could be delegated, in part, to a state health and welfare agency, which would
possess the authority to obtain cease and desist orders with respect to
certain conduct by prospective parents. 59 Such enforcement would
be facilitated by passage of mandatory reporting laws, which would
increase the agency's access to information regarding conduct potentially harmful to the unborn. Discussion of such laws has only recently become worthwhile, as scientific and medical advances in the
past few years have produced significant new insights into the link
between prenatal conduct by prospective parents and others and
cause a child handicaps under present scientific and medical understanding markedly
rises and differs after the child's birth.
157. CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1982). For a construction of the statute.
see People v. Yates, 114 Cal. App. Supp. 782, 298 P. 961 (1931). See also Malek v.
Yekani-Fard, 51 U.S.L.W. 2356 (La. Sup. Ct. Dec. 29, 1982); In re Dodge, 9 FAM. L.
REP. (BNA) 2165 (Kan. App. Ct. Dec. 16, 1982).
158. Such a civil action was allowed in Kyne v. Kyne, 38 Cal. App. 2d 122, 100
P.2d 806 (1940) (relying on the California Penal Code provision regarding furnishing of
necessities to unborn children, as well as Civil Code provisions on establishing paternity
and on the parental duty to support illegitimate children). Bul see Justus v. Atchison, 19
Cal. 3d 564, 579, 565 P.2d 122, 132, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 107 (1977) (suggesting that Civil
Code provisions on "children" might not apply to the unborn for the legislative enactment does not contain "specific" intent or "appropriate terms"); In re Steven S.,126 Cal.
App. 3d 23, 178 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1981) (relying on the decision in Justus to find unborn
fetus not a "person" under dependent child statute).
159. See, e.g., In re Baby X, 97 Mich. App. 111. 293 N.W.2d 736 (1980) (custody of
newborn awarded to state based on proof of mother's prenatal treatment, wherein neglect
was found resulting from prenatal maternal drug addiction).
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newborns' birth handicaps. 16 0 As further insights are gained, preventive child abuse laws may be feasible for conduct long preceding
even the conception of the child who is to be protected from abuse.
At times, state protection of unborn children from the abusive
acts of their prospective parents might require assertion of custody
over those children. Quite obviously, such assertions would also entail state custody of either the prospective mother or father. There is
precedent for such custody orders, but its scope is limited. In one
case involving state custody of an unborn child, a woman in her last
week of normal pregnancy had refused to undergo a caesarian section on religious grounds.' 6' Without the section, there was a virtual
certainty that the unborn child would die and a fifty percent chance
that the woman would die; with the section, there was a virtual cer62
tainty that both the unborn child and the woman would survive.
The court granted temporary custody of the fetus to a state agency
and authorized the agency to consent to the performance of the caesarian section and any other necessary medical procedures for a successful birth. 163 In a second case involving a third trimester
pregnancy, a court found the woman would need blood transfusions
some time prior to delivery in order to preserve her own life and the
life of her child.164 Again, the woman posed religious objections, but
again the court issued an order requiring the medical treatment
when deemed necessary.165 These two cases are of limited scope because in both cases the judicially-ordered medical treatment would
preserve the life of both the unborn and its mother.
State assumption of custody of a prospective parent for the purpose of protecting that parent's future offspring would also be legitimate even where the parent's life is not threatened, but where the
child's future well being, as opposed to its life, is threatened.16 6 Cer160.

Chicago Sun-Times, Jan. 20, 1983, at 28, col. I (reporting research which

found cigarette smoke passively inhaled by a pregnant woman can harm her unborn
baby).

161. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457
(1981).
162. Id. at 88, 274 S.E.2d at 459.
163. Id., 274 S.E.2d at 459-60.
164. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hosp. v. Anderson, 42 N.J. 421, 42223, 201 A.2d 537, 537-38 (1964).
165. Id., 201 A.2d at 538.
166. Attempts at such state custody may be found in In re Steven S., 126 Cal. App.
3d 23, 178 Cal. Rptr. 525 (1981) (a pregnant woman in her third trimester, but with an
"undiagnosed psychiatric illness." could not be detained on the premise that her unborn
child was a "dependent child of the court" under the Welfare and Institutions Code,
since the Code did not cover unborn children) and In re Dittrick Infant, 80 Mich. App.
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tainly, the state interest would have to be compelling in cases involving pregnant women and others who have constitutionally protected
privacy rights167 that may be undermined even though they gain no
physical benefits. Yet, a strong case can be made for state custody in
a detoxification center of a pregnant woman addicted to heroin. 16
There is also an arguable case for state custody of both males and
females of childbearing age for the purpose of conducting genetic
tests geared to providing information about the prospective of preventable handicaps-particularly where the tests are not very intrusive and where the means of prevention are available and easily

employed.

3.

169

ProcreationLaws

The most controversial legal means of protecting newborns
from physical and mental handicaps is the regulation of procreation
so that certain newborns will never be born. 170 Such laws are
founded on the premise that it is sometimes better not to be born
than to be born. Because this premise has already served as the basis
for certain tort17 1 and criminal 172 laws, it seems appropriate to ex219, 223, 263 N.W.2d 37, 39 (1977) (where a pregnant woman had abused an earlier
child, the Michigan Probate Code involving child custody was read not to include unborn persons, but amendments would be desirable). For state proceedings when prenatal
custody fails, see In re Baby X, 97 Mich. App. III. 293 N.W.2d 736 (1980).
167. 410 U.S. at 153-53 (right to personal privacy has some extension to activities
relating to marriage, procreation, family relationships and childrearing).
168. Comment, The Right of the Fetus to be Born Freeof Drug Addiction. 7 U.C.D.
L. REV. 45 (1974).
169. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass.
728. 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977): Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980),
mod sub nom. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (1981).
170. Supra note 91 and accompanying text.
171. Turpin, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346, wherein the court stated:
Considering the short life span of many of these children and their frequently
very limited ability to perceive or enjoy the benefits of life, we cannot assert
with confidence that in every situation there would be a societal consensus that
life is preferable to never having been born at all . . . it thus seems doubtful
that a child's claim for general damages should properly be denied on the rationale that the value of impaired life, as a matter of law always exceeds the
value of nonlife ...
Id. The court proceeded to allow a child to recover special damages for the extraordinary expenses necessary to treat a hereditary ailment, where but for the defendant's negligence. the child would not have been born. Id. at 966, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
172. For example, criminal incest laws affecting competent and consenting adults.
where the primary legal intent is to promote the well-being of the unborn by preventing
the biological mutations that may occur. See supra note 11.
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plore how handicap prevention might be promoted through the discouragement or prohibition of certain births.
Births can be discouraged in a number of ways, including the
creation of financial incentives and the regulation of decision-making regarding childbirth. 73 Of course, state action cannot be unduly
burdensome. 74 Recognition of an unborn's interest in not being
born with severe handicaps could thus be encouraged by state
financial support of the prospective parent's desire to abort, or to
procure either a prenatal screening test such as amniocentesis or a
surgical operation leading to sterility. Given the accessability of
abortions, births of newborns with severe handicaps could also be
discouraged by the state determination not to provide financial
assistance to certain parents who give birth to newborns with severe
handicaps. Regulations of decision-making regarding childbirth
could also discourage the birth of handicapped newborns by facilitating access to sterilization and other forms of contraception to
those incompetent prospective parents who do not wish to bear such

children. 175

As well, births can be prohibited in a number of ways. 176 For
example, involuntary sterilization laws prohibit the birth of
newborns likely to suffer from certain hereditary ailments. Such a
compulsory eugenic sterilization law was sanctioned by the Supreme
1 77
Court of the United States over fifty years ago in Buck v. Bell.
173. Parness & Pritchard, supra note 75, at 292.
174. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,
473-74 (1977).
175. Only a few years ago, a majority of courts held that without explicit legislative
authorization, they lacked the power to sanction the sterilization of a mental incompetent. In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 261-62, 426 A.2d 467, 480-81 (1981); In re C.D.M., 627
P.2d 607, 609-10 (Alaska 1981). A contrary trend, however, does seem to have developed. In re Moe, 385 Mass. App. Ct. 555, 432 N.E.2d 712 (1982); Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hosp., Inc., 293 Md. 685, 447 A.2d 1244 (1982). Where judicial power has been
recognized, the incompetent prospective parent's wishes can only be gleaned through the
use of such tests as "best interests", In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 264, 426 A.2d 467, 482
(1981), or "substituted judgment" In re Moe, 385 Mass. App. Ct. 555, 560, 432 N.E.2d
712. 719-20 (1982).
176. Consider whether prohibition of the birth of a handicapped newborn would
be justified when the mother is clinically dead. See Chicago Sun-Times, Jan. 22, 1983. at
38. col. I (mother clinically dead for two days gave birth to premature baby, although
doctors tried to discourage father from requesting birth as they felt baby was deformed):
compare id.. Mar. 31, 1983, at 32, col. I (woman who was brain dead for sixty-four days
gave birth to healthy baby and then had her life support system discontinued). See also
Dillon. Life Support and Maternal Brain Death During Pregnancy,. 248 J. Am. MED. A.
1089 (1982).
177. 274 U.S. 200 (1927). In part, the Virginia law may also have been founded on
social need. such as sterilization to prevent the birth of a child whose parents cannot care

DUTY TO PREVENT HANDICAPS

1983]

There, the Court upheld a Virginia statute which provided for the
sexual sterilization of any mentally defective inmate of a state institution where "the health of the patient and the welfare of society"
would be promoted. 7 8 The statute was applied in Buck to an eighteen year old woman who was the daughter of a feeble-minded woman, the mother of an illegitimate feeble-minded child, the probable
potential parent of socially inadequate offspring likewise afflicted,
and who was capable of being sterilized without detriment to her
general health.' 7 9 The decision in Buck continues to be regarded as
authority supporting the validity of compulsory eugenic sterilization
laws, 180 although there is now dispute about some of its scientific
findings,' 8' its mode of legal analysis, 8 2 and its view of legitimate
governmental interests. 83 Should more acceptable scientific understanding be developed on the role heredity plays in handicaps to
newborns, compulsory eugenic sterilization laws may again be
fashionable.

84

1

Births of newborns with handicaps can also be prohibited
through the passage of criminal incest laws. In Illinois, the crime of
aggravated incest is defined as including sexual intercourse between
any male and his blood daughter or between any female and her
blood son, regardless of the daughter's or son's age.' 85 Because prosecutions can occur even when the son or daughter is over 21 years of
age, and thus is "sufficiently mature and autonomous to be free from
for it. Compulsory sterilization laws founded on such social need raise even more questions than do eugenic sterilization laws. Parness & Pritchard, supra note 75. at 290-91.
178. 274 U.S. at 205.
179. Id. at 207.
180. North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp.
451 (M.D.N.C. 1976) (upholding North Carolina's compulsory sterilization law): In re
Moore. 289 N.C. 95, 221 S.E.2d 307 (1976). Seealso 410 U.S. at 154 (citing Buck v. Bell.
274 U.S. 200, 207-08 (1927), for proposition that the privacy right is not absolute).
181. Ferster, Eliminating the Unfit-Is Sterilization the ,4nswer?. 27 OHIO ST. L.J.
591. 619 (1966); O'Hara & Sanks, Eugenic Steriliation, 45 GEo. L.J. 20, 31. 37 (1956).
182. See, e.g., North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v.North Carolina. 420
F. Supp. 451, 458 (M.D.N.C.1976) (noting that a rational basis, rather than compelling
state interest standard was used in Buck).
183. In re Moe. 385 Mass. App. Ct. 555, 560, 432 N.E.2d 712. 717 (1982) (state has
no recognizable interest in compelling the sterilization of its citizens): In re Grady, 85
N.J. 235, 246-47, 426 A.2d 467, 472-73 n.3 (1981) (finding eugenic sterilization to be
immoral): CAL. CIVIL CODE § 43.6(a) (West 1982) ("No cause of action arises against a
parent of a child based upon the claim that the child should not have been conceived or.
if conceived, should not have been allowed to have been born alive").
184. In re AW., 637 P.2d 366, 368-69 (Colo. 1981) (compulsory sterilization law
would be constitutional if it furthered a compelling governmental interest-though no
contemporary statutes were found to further such an interest).
185. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § I 1-10 (Smith-Hurd 1979).
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undue parental pressure to submit to sexual advances," 8 6 biological
risks to the offspring serve as the exclusive legitimate state interest in
187
the legislation.
V.

CONCLUSION

While the concentration on the legal means of securing additional rights for handicapped persons is commendable, the general
failure to address the legal means by which handicaps in newborns
can be prevented is unfortunate. Recent scientific and medical advances have greatly expanded the role which law can now play in
avoiding or eliminating many potential birth handicaps. As well,
contemporary discussion of possible legal reaction to further scientific and medical advances is warranted. It should aid in expediting
legal innovations upon the arrival of such advances and thus reduce
the harm accruing during the traditional time lag between scientific
and legal change.
At the present time, laws promoting the prevention of handicaps
to newborns are indirect, incoherent and inadequate. Laws should
be made more direct, thereby recognizing the unborn as persons entitled to protection from prenatal acts likely to cause them handicaps
at birth. Laws should be made more coherent so that when the unborn are recognized as persons, the fullest legal protection possible is
extended on their behalf. Finally, laws should be made more adequate, extending beyond the traditional tort and criminal law areas
into such areas as federal regulatory protection, child support, abuse
and custody acts, and laws discouraging or prohibiting procreation.
The time has come to discuss more fully our responsibility for our
future childrens' health and well-being.

186. Id. (committee comment).
187. While cultural traditions are sometimes noted, id., they serve as an inappropriate basis. Supra note II. See also R. v. Winch, 1974 CRIM. L. REV. 487 (relying on
the possible disastrous effects on any children).

